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1. Introduction to the case 
 
The title European Capital of Culture (ECC) is annually awarded by the 
European Union to grant the nominated town the opportunity to present its 
cultural life and developments. A number of European towns have used the 
title to transform and improve their cultural life, as well as their national and 
international reputation.  Formally, this kind of project belongs to the 
European Common Cultural Policy since the designated city celebrates 
dozens of cultural programmes and events. But for the last decade the 
scheme could be characterised rather as a complex urban development 
project with strong connections to culture/knowledge-based investments.  
 
The case study of ECC in Pécs, 2010 focuses much more on the large and 
complex urban development project implemented within a relatively short 
time. The complex development package was financed by the Structural 
Funds so the case provides information on how an integrated urban 
development program can be proceed within the concrete local, national and 
European multilevel institutional context. 
 
Pécs is a medium size Hungarian city near the Croatian border and it counts 
as a regional centre in Hungary, with it’s about 150,000 inhabitants. The 
former coal-mining city started to decline after 1990 after industrial activities 
were almost completely eliminated. The Balkan war worsened the economic 
situation even further, along with its historically poor accessibility from the 
Hungarian capital Budapest. The ECC project was therefore a key opportunity 
to catch up and generate economic growth.  
 
The town is the centre of an economically declining NUTS 2 region which 
enjoyed priority within the framework of the so called “Pole programme” of the 
National Development Plan (2007–2013) designed for the absorption of the 
Structural Funds. The top down target of the Pole Programme was to 
strengthen cohesion within the artificially created development regions 
through the “bottom-up” development of the central towns within the regions.  
 
As the bid formulated, the ECC project was an excellent chance for the city to 
launch a “cultural turn of urban development” (2005: 14). The development 
paradigm stemmed from the western literature, although the cultural assets of 
the city provided real basis for the plan. The aim was to construct new cultural 
institutions (concert hall, library, exhibition centre), the regeneration of an old 
industrial district for cultural activities, and the renovation of public places; 
each assuming that the developments would substantiate subsequent 
development opportunities using culture (creative and performance cultural 
industries) for economic growth. As the “gate to Balkan” or the “Southern 
Cultural Zone”, there were elements aimed at cooperating with neighbours 
both within the region and abroad. The total investment (cultural institutions, 
public spaces, and a motorway) was a realatively large monetary intervention 
for Hungary. 
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The five-year story was a hectic process which was full of conflicts. The local 
struggles with time, politics, media, central government departments, 
development agencies, European offices and with the disappointed local 
stakeholders each provide evidence on mechanisms and determinants of a 
complex urban development programme in the territorial governance context 
characterised by centralised finance and decision making system, and 
therefore by a paternalistic political culture.  
 
The ECC program was challenging from two aspects: first was the fact that 
central and local levels of governance had to collaborate with each other; and 
second, that European institutions had to apply the partnership model for the 
collaboration with the civil society, and creative communities (partnership). 
Both of these challenges are conceptual pillars of the European multi-level 
governance model and therefore the project is precedent of the 
Europeanisation process. 
 
The implementation proceeded both in a horizontal (among sectors, policies) 
and vertical (among levels) framework, which required innovative solutions to 
harmonise project actions with the traditional, parliamentary government 
system. The most important governance feature of this project, however, was 
that it needed a bottom-up, place-based approach since the city was in the 
focus, but the centralised decision making system gave not enough place of 
movement to behave “place-based”.  
 
The project combined various policy sectors (cultural policy, regeneration of 
public spaces), and had a complex set of territorial considerations (i.e., 
different parts of the city, its agglomeration, the broader region and beyond 
the borders, etc.). This so-called large project was actually a punctual and 
drastic involvement into the development of the city with all its risks, which is 
generally characteristic for similarly large projects (Häussermann and Simons, 
2000).  
 
The project management organisation thus suffered from a fragmented and 
centralised governance context, as well as a branch-oriented management 
model of Structural Funds and a lack of local governance potential. All of 
these obstacles were also embedded in an Eastern European political culture 
characterised by a lack of trust and tolerance, and even state manipulation 
(even corruption). 
 
The case study gives an outlook on the era when the Hungarian territorial 
governance reforms occurred, therefore rescaling and restructuring the 
territorial administration in Hungary. 
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2. Integrating policy sectors 
 
a. Formal and informal actors, and institutions designed for cooperation 
between regional levels, sectors and branches 
 
In order to List the solutions used during the project we have to distinguish the 
ordinary public institutions and the new agents and forms established 
specially for the project. 
 The general public bodies (like the central (national) government and 
local government assembly) formally made the main decisions 
(selecting the application, programming, investments, selecting the 
staff, finance etc.). The central government discussed the issues of the 
project only to a limited extent. Although the central government units 
dominated the project there was no a single designated agent at this 
level to coordinate the local actions. The central level was rather a 
loose group of persons representing some ministries, and therefore the 
central government could not harmonise the separate actions involved 
in the project. 
 The local self-government assembly was of course much deeper 
involved, but it made its decisions under time pressure and on forced 
track, having no real chance to consider and harmonise the project 
targets for the long term (Takáts, 2011). The actual operational tasks 
always oppressed the examination of long term consequences. The 
time pressure and the lack of local alternatives explain why the 
assembly made its decision with formal consensus (vice mayor 
responsible for culture). When the assembly voted on the bid most of 
the representatives just left the book in the council room unwrapped 
(interview J). 
 
The project cycle was dogged by the confusion of competences of permanent 
and (new) temporary managers. The city hall would have been fundamentally 
appropriate for the overall project management, however the majority of the 
tasks were finally outsourced to a special management company and 
therefore the city hall was not in the overall coordination (ECC Pécs 2010 
evaluation report, 2011).  
 
Management and integration forms set up for the project cycle: 
 The typical formal platforms of cooperation and policy integration were 
the various committees at national and local levels consisting of 
selected representatives of governance levels, policy branches 
(ministries), sectors (civil, artisan organisations, professional groups, 
business) and territorial partners (other cities, the county government, 
local governments abroad). These had mostly no formal decision-
making competences and lacked a legal background. For the cultural 
events aspects and investments separate inter-departmental 
committees were set up, so that there was no single special body with 
complex and overall overlook of the entire ECC. The number of local 
bodies was higher and more diverse as the following figure presents. 
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 There were nominated commissioners in order to help the information 
flow and transmitting of personal contacts between the top and the 
bottom. These persons sometimes had formal power (the first one was 
a state secretary) but rather informal influence as well being “good, 
powerful clients” of the government (for example members of the 
parliament), but their activity occurred rather in the grey zone of 
governance. The central government insisted of its representation even 
in local bodies. Thus every member of the artistic council, consequently 
the local members too had to be assigned by the minister. The 
governmental commissioners defined their mission not only as the 
mediation between the two tiers but as the coordination between 
elements of the project (interview B).  
 The company responsible for the direct management of the project 
(Pécs 2010 Development Ltd.) and its head could have played a key 
role. However, the concrete person was changed during the project, 
which symbolised the distrust against them. The statement of an 
interviewee on the real role of the organisation is fairly characteristic: 
“we were not assigned to question what the town and the county 
wanted, but much more to perform and implement their wish; the 
feasibility study is about to implement the investments. Since the town 
is the proprietor we can put an equal mark between the self-
government and us” (interview E). The local coordination bodies were 
run by the management organisation although it had neither 
empowering nor sufficient administrative capacity to synthetise the 
information and opinions gathered or to make decisions.  
 
b. Mechanisms of public policy packaging  
 
The recent general ECC regulation recommends the combination of cultural 
events and investments with the broader urban and regional development 
context; recognising that culture may be a driving force of local/regional 
development and economy. The relatively soft cultural policy of the EU 
supports regional identity, combining socio-economic and cultural 
development, and opening up new ways of participation for the local/regional 
civil society. The synergy however is still missing between different policy 
fields and cultural aspects are usually neglected in the different policies 
(During et al. 2009) although these driving forces are recognised as an 
innovation potential in development policy. Paradoxically, Structural Funds’ 
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regulation does not favour integrated solutions since it is difficult to coordinate 
and finance an integrated project from different funds. 
 
The other dilemma is how single projects are to be integrated into the general 
institutional framework. The temporally created “project” structures work well if 
the permanent government structures are able to integrate them (the problem 
of the best “fit”), if the administrative and political culture is compatible, and if 
the actors can behave as partners. ECC projects should be integrated into 
overall context of city-marketing and cultural industry or more generally of 
creative cities (Cook and Lazzeretti, 2008). The so-called project-based 
organisation could be efficient if it was embedded also in the territory (Belussi 
and Sedita, 2008) and in the governance traditions. 
 
Looking at our case these dilemmas also emerged. 
 The first stage of policy packaging is planning. In our case, the first 
phase was the preparation of the bid aimed to be selected by the 
national government as the holder of title of ECC. The bid was 
prepared by a very small team representing different institutions, 
profiles and disciplines. Only a few persons worked really at the 
beginning - inviting local civic organisations, artists, scholars mostly 
informally in order to collect ideas, program elements. This face to face 
working method was ideal to gain support and build trust. This period 
focused mostly on the cultural challenges and programming, since 
business and urban planners were absent (Takáts, 2011).  
 The relatively independent local cultural elite involving the civil society 
was working on the second bid (Tarrósy, 2011). The city hall financed 
the bid but did not care too much about them. The mayor started to use 
this challenge to build his own political carrier and also to grant political 
support for huge infrastructural investments, like the highway between 
the capital and Pécs, the airport near to Pécs etc. It means that the 
policy packaging occured both by the formal planning and informal 
lobbying for additional infrastructural development. The narrow group 
had no knowledge in urban planning, and were isolated from the 
experts to involve practical considerations. As a result, the identification 
of the five large investments (concert hall, library, exhibition hall, 
Zsolnay cultural district, and public places) was rather the result of ad 
hoc individual ambitions than it was about rational and comprehensive 
“planning” (Takáts, 2011).  
 The third phase of planning was the preparation of investments - that 
is, the real programming within the frame of Regional Operative 
Programme financed by the European Structural Funds. When the 
preparation of the big investments started in 2005–06 there was no 
national plan for the next programming period 2007–13. This fact 
hindered the ability to imbed the project within a more general policy 
programme or iniatiave (interview E). The aims and philosophy of ECC 
were mentioned in the Regional Operative Programme, for instance, 
culture based development, opening towards the Balkans, renewing 
public spaces etc. In spite of that there was not too much synergy 
between the ECC and the Regional Operative Programme. Although 
the ECC project was officially a so-called prioritised project selected by 
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a central government decree during the programming and 
implementation, all of the investments of the project package were 
selected and managed by separate applications (each having 3–4000 
pages of documents). For the programming it was obligatory to follow 
the instructions of the handbook made for integrated urban 
development - that is, to prepare an integrated urban development 
strategy, action plans, feasibility plan, sustainability/feasibility analysis, 
etc. This was a very intensive period in 2008, when the applications 
and programs were designed by external and not local consulting 
companies. Although local independent experts at the university and 
other academic organisations had much more local knowledge for this 
task, the cultural strategy was prepared by external experts 
commissioned by the city hall. So, there was no time and interest to 
consider the interdependencies of the different elements in the 
concrete local space (interview E). The programming was regarded 
rather as a task to be ticked, and the Regional Operative Programme 
remained a residual frame of the smaller scale local project. 
 It is important to emphasize the agreement concluded by the 
government and the town in which the government provided a 
contribution to the costs of the preparation and communication and it 
contained the main investments and their financial construction. This 
contract placed the minister for culture and education into the key 
position because Pécs “would not have been able to fight its battle with 
the minister for finance alone” (interview B). Due to this contractual 
relationship the central level organs had to keep their promise even at 
the times when it was harder to raise money (interview C). 
 The finance is also a mechanism by which policy packaging is enabled 
or hindered. Money from the European Structural Funds was available, 
since Pécs is eligible as a centre of a “lagging behind” region. The EU 
financial model however had a big disadvantage, namely the very slow 
and difficult process of using the European funds and due to the 
difficulties of integrating money from different operational programmes. 
The external financial and procedural determination proved to be an 
obstacle to integrate the elements of the project (interview E). The city 
had to apply separately in the case of each investment to the National 
Development Agency – a process which dragged out the 
implementation phase, disabled the local creativeness and left no 
space to handling problems in complex, “place-based” and flexible 
way. Despite the strict requirements of the Structural Funds concerning 
feasibility and sustainability, almost all of the investments, as new 
cultural institutions, are recently suffering with the problem of running 
costs. For example in the time of construction nobody knew precisely 
who will be the real owner, which kind of functions and profile will the 
huge cultural district in the place of the former Zsolnay ceramic 
company have, or how the new concert hall will be financed (interview 
H). The strict public procurement regulation for example made it 
impossible to prioritise the local business companies (interview E), 
even the catering services were provided not by local companies and 
the cultural events, and attractions were celebrated in such a way that 
locals were many times excluded. 
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c. Dominating  policy sectors 
 
Looking back to the original aim of the project it is questionable whether one 
short term project could be able to move the city into completely different 
development direction; especially when the main governmental actors showed 
a weak commitment to change the former routines?   
 During the project period the original cultural aims and elements were 
step by step weakening and the infrastructural development and 
investments were becoming dominant. Almost all of the energy of local 
governance were used in the struggle with the time in order to 
complete the huge investments, but another, hidden explanation is 
more convincing - that is, achieving visible success in short term is 
easier than to launch long term, invisible, “softer” development 
processes (interview D). So, instead of the complex, integrated city 
development or renewing, grandiose building construction and one 
year long cultural jamboree has been implemented. The new 
investments have not been coupled by conscious restructuring of 
economy and human capital development (see ECC Pécs 2010 
evaluation report, 2011).  
 The territorial considerations have also disappeared during the time 
although special programmes were launched for the settlements in the 
regions. For example, for creating jobs connecting to the ECC 
implementation (tourism, communication, joint cultural programmes), 
but since the representatives of the region were not involved into the 
decision making the original promises for cooperation have been 
forgotten and the city (called in the bid as “borderless”) was was more 
of an island that implemented its own investments. 
 
d. Conflicts 
 
The ECC projects are always full of conflicts (see Palmer reports); and indeed 
this was the case in Pécs as well. But the main conflicts were not found 
between the similar actors like is typically in the former ECC stories.  
 Generally the most crucial (and for ECC project typical) conflicts 
emerged between the city hall and the direct project management 
(interview E). The “project type” decision-making process suffered 
under the distrust between “ordinary” bureaucrats and the external 
“project managers”, a problem that was exasperated by the traditional 
central–local tensions. However, from our point of view, a temporal 
management organisation employing new personall would be by no 
means able to connect sectors since it had no enough space of 
movement and personal resources to consider all of the dimensions 
which would be crucial.  
 Besides this rather “normal” or “expectable” conflict between the local 
government and the management organisation the tensions between 
the central and local level were predominant.  
 The theoretically most important level and actor group should be the 
local civil ones because of the project aim to generate local ideas, and 
to involve local citizens and stakeholders. But the locality has been 
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progressively weakened during the project (Tarrósy, 2011). The third 
line of conflicts emerged between public and civil actors since the latter 
group have been excluded after they had elaborated the successful bid 
(Takáts, 2011). Later on the civil organisations and individuals 
participated neither in the decision making nor in the execution. 
Locality would be an ideal frame where sectors almost automatically 
are joining each other in a very pragmatic way. This opportunity has 
been missed in Pécs.  
 
e. Synergies, barriers of cross-sectoral integration 
 
It is no wonder that not so much synergies have been emerged among the 
different interventions. The two lines (urban development and cultural) of 
programming and their public institutional frameworks were separated and 
even the actors which could represent locally holistic, integrated approach 
(like civic and business sector) were almost excluded. Neither the dominant 
governance level (the central one) nor the involved sectors (mostly public) 
were properly designated and the transmitting mechanisms proved to be not 
strong enough to bridge the gaps. The investments did not launch long term 
development changes, the cultural programs did not enable local actors to act 
beyond 2010 and also, the figures of tourism growth potential were not overly 
convincing. Although fashionable (and partially expected by the EU), the 
paradigm of culture-based urban economic development was but was not 
realised in Pécs from several reasons:  
 ECC in Pécs was not regarded as an integrated urban development 
project from the central level. Most of the political actors at central level 
were ambivalent towards the “pure local” project.  
 Local politicians who took the most important decisions did not truly 
believe that the culture could be a main driving force of economic 
development. Local artists, independent experts, university teachers 
however had no direct influence on the cultural programming and didn’t 
have the private capital to launch projects aimed at developing cultural 
business.  
 While the staff of cultural public institutions had closer access to the 
cultural programming than the independent civics or business men 
(who would invest into the cultural industry), the interests and opinions 
of cultural institutions (status quo) and of the “independent creatives” 
differed. A good example is that instead of building workshops or 
galleries for local artists, the programme ffundes were instead used to 
construct the exhibition hall (for an out-of-town audience) (interview H). 
Although the cultural industry has been mentioned in different 
documents, the culture-based business firms, “clusters” have been 
established only far later and independently from the ECC. 
Unfortunately most of them did not prove to be successful.  
 The ECC had crucial expectations concerning tourism since, according 
to the literature, the effect of larger festivals can be well evaluated and 
measured (Kundi, 2012). The marketing activity, however, was also 
centralised (interview G) and the city was not able to coordinate the 
activity of other from touristic aspects attractive places, so the city 
could not sell itself efficiently. 
ESPON 2013 14 
 
3. Coordinating actions of actors and institutions 
 
a. Governance capacity. Mechanisms and constraints of coordination 
 
The governance of the project needed a strong cooperation between levels 
(European. national, local) and sectors (cultural policy, urban development, 
cultural industry, urban regeneration, etc.) but the real channels and powerful 
actors were centrally controlled. This fact was the main obstacle for place-
based /territorial and policy integration causing a big loss of synergy and a 
number of sustainability problems later.  
 
Within the case we can distinguish between the public 
(political/administrative) and technocratic or management type of governance: 
the public political and administrative sector dominated the whole project due 
to the fact that almost everything has been financed by public (national and 
EU) money. It was almost absoultely unsuccessful to attract private 
investments or actions with the public ones (interview I). The whole process 
was over politicised since actors having public, elected legitimacy or party 
affiliation insisted to their “responsibility” and power, during the negotiations 
with outsiders the argumentation was frequently used, “we take the 
responsibility”, or “we know better” (interview B). The tolerance and the ability 
to make compromises are generally missing from the political and 
administrative staff in Hungary. It became a slogan during the ECC project 
that one of the most important tasks would be to establish the culture of 
cooperation in order to be successful. But this task would need more time and 
commitment to be achieved. Thus:  
 A significant territorial governance feature was the dominance of the 
central level. There was no chance to behave as a partner of the 
central government the political actors associated with it. As such, 
there was a clear governing hierarchy rather than horizontal 
coordination; so bargaining and informal political pressure was 
dominant within this multi-level governance game (interview F). The 
contract between the city and the central government was seemingly 
horizontal but in the end the will of the central government prevailed.  
 Within the local arena it is indisputable that the mayor personally 
dominated the decision making process (interview G). He was in the 
middle of the networks. Unfortunately three persons held this position 
during the project which caused lot of difficulties in rebuilding personal 
contacts. 
 
Another central issue here was the management system of Structural Funds: 
that is, the connections between the National Development Agency (and its 
regional branch) and the ECC project management centre in Pécs. This 
formal mechanism was strictly regulated (following the European procedural 
requirements) which designated the roles and the frames of movement so the 
actors had not so much chance to bypass them. Sometimes these clearer 
rules seemed to be too inflexible and time consuming causing delay etc., but 
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according to the interviews this context was fair and transparent since the 
political arena was dark and unpredictable. 
 
b. Leadership and subsidiarity or what instead of? The national governance 
context matters    
 
The crucial point to understand what happened in Pécs is that Hungary is a 
centralised country, where even though subsidiarity was a frequently 
mentioned principle in official political documents and events, neither regions 
nor cities or civil society are able to reconcile and enforce their interests and 
values. 
 
Formally, the local government was the owner of the project but it missed the 
legal, financial preconditions to control the whole process confirming the old 
rule “He who pays the piper call the tune”. In other words, there were no 
resources for the local programming from the beginning and the dependency 
on national or EU funds filtered through national bodies remained during the 
whole project cycle. Referring to the fact that the national government paid the 
cultural programmes, a central cultural agency (Hungarofest) was been 
commissioned for the management of the local cultural programmes to 
celebrate in 2010. Therefore, the local management, the ECC artistic director 
and local artists were almost completely excluded which was really unique in 
the history of ECC projects (interview G). The external determination and 
inserting “outsiders” (central agencies) into the system limited the local 
discretion made the decision-making process slowly and difficult, less 
transparent and unpredictable contributing to the loss of trust. The central 
actors mostly tried to avoid any risk which limited also the local innovations 
and flexibility (interview D). The representative of the ministry of culture said 
about the cultural programme: “It wasn’t bad but had no face!” (interview C) 
 
The urban development investments were also externally controlled by the 
regime of European structural funds. Both, the National and the Regional 
Development Agency were obliged to control the entire process (applying, 
planning, public procurement etc.) following the strict EU regulations and 
regularly reporting to the EU Commission. These agencies behaved possibly 
the most rational although the decision making processes were extremely 
slow but on the other side they prescribed for example feasibility studies and 
eliminated the big exhibition hall from the “list of dreams” declaring that it will 
be unsustainable (interview J). Experts of these elements of European 
regulations and its national and local agents tried to keep the project to some 
extent close to the European standards and provided special skills for the 
operators but most of the domestic stakeholders regarded these frames rather 
as obstacles than guaranties of the quality and efficiency. 
 
The fragmented, non-transparent governance context also made it difficult to 
keep in hand all of the factors and dimensions. The central government 
agencies (National Development Agency and Hungarofest) became the real 
leaders together with the intensive executive mission of the local project 
management firm. Even the most appropriate organisation, the elected local 
government (and its administrative background), lost their leadership function 
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even though they were the ones possessing the complex, local knowledge 
and commitment. This centralised leadership model has led to the lack of 
legitimacy and local civic support. The absence of civil and private actors 
explains why so called “urban regime” has not been emerged and the public 
actors missed a strong local “advocacy coalition” as well.   
 
There was no time and firm ambition to investigate which governance mode 
would fit to this project; and to be totally honest, there was no clear design of 
the whole governance cycle from the beginning. When problems arose, the 
result was ad hoc solutions and no regulated channels of feedback. Although 
monitoring was prescribed by the EU regulation, these reports were written for 
the “European audience” and not from an implementation perspective (in 
order to learn the correct processes and where they would be needed).  
 
We also have to mention that Hungarian governance culture generally lacks 
an evaluation phase and even the professional and institutional frames are 
missing for this activity. Unfortunately this was the case with the ex-post 
evaluation of this project as well. The central government completely forgotten 
this “episode” because election took place in 2010 and the new cabinet 
started with a more comprehensive governance reform (new constitution etc.).  
 
The same thing happened in the local sphere as the intention to evaluate the 
lessons of ECC project is still lacking. But the recent problems (economic 
crisis, lack of money to run the new institutions etc.) are too big to neglect the 
past, and because the expectations considering the ECC were too ambitious, 
so the re-elected mayor asked independent experts to investigate the impacts 
of ECC. Although the report is an honest writing it is not an appropriate basis 
for a comprehensive and planning of the future.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, there is a real danger to continue the former 
practice again since the new EU cohesion policy period has been 
approaching and the cities have to draw their development conceptions and 
concrete projects soon in order to be included them into the national wide 
plan. So the city is considering new project ideas without firm visions or 
elaborated experiences and clear lessons learned from the past.  
 
 
4. Mobilising stakeholder participation 
 
The ECC projects in general, as Sykes (2011) argues have a bottom-up spirit 
because their mission makes it necessary to generate local ideas, to build 
trust and to involve potential sponsors. This was the case in the first stage in 
Pécs too. It was also the case when the task was to convince local politicians 
about the sense of applying for ECC status, and when local actors needed to 
cooperate with each other to win. During that stage, the Pécs 2010 
Management Centre was the platform of a broad informal network that 
allowed participation for individuals according to their merits and skills and 
even to have a say in some decisions. In the second phase of the tendering 
phase, local management already had a complex organisational structure, 
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with a Bidding Cabinet, a Bidding Office, a Board (for consultation with the 
city’s leadership), its own Programme Council, a Development Council and 
several working-groups encompassing more than a hundred persons. The 
different project components were presented to an international body of 
experts (Somlyódy, 2010). 
 
Cooperation between the city hall and the project management was promised 
right through the success of the bid. Real conflicts emerged during the project 
implementation phase, almost immediately after the official announcement 
because of the city hall’s obvious intention to centralise competences 
(Rampton et al. 2011). It is, of course, hard to involve artists, cultural 
institutions and civic groups in a very intensive and complex process. 
Tensions between politicians, bureaucrats, managers and the direct 
stakeholders in culture are evident as they all have different interests, 
attitudes and positions within the local sphere. 
 
a. Local stakeholders and their options for participation 
 
Integration of the following local stakeholders seemed necessary at the 
beginning of the implementation phase: 1) the local economy; 2) the project 
consortium partners 3) neighbouring local governments (including foreign 
ones); 4) local intellectuals and generally the “civil community”. 
 
Actors representing the local economy 
At the very beginning the city hall categorically expressed its intention to 
concentrate all the relevant powers and functions one infrastructure 
developments (General Assembly of Pécs minutes, 2006). This approach 
hampered the integration of the local and broad business sector, and it was 
drastically against the original motives basing the injection of external financial 
sources (ECC Pécs 2010 evaluation report, 2011). Though some company 
leaders were involved to help the preparation of the five key investments, due 
to their tight connections to the mayor (almost all of the involved company 
leaders managed firms which were owned by the local government and 
supplied public services). 
 
Although the bid set the target of an economic model change by the dynamic 
emergence of cultural and creative industry, this absolutely failed (Pálné 
Kovács, 2012). Local stakeholders (mainly small and medium sized 
enterprises, SMEs) were excluded from the planning phase and also from the 
implementation of developments. However, it is important to notice that these 
local SMEs were really too weak and struggled with capital- and capacity-
shortages (interview E). Actors from the local business sector were too 
disorganised to compete with important large firms from the national level. 
The few – in overall insignificant – involvements were outcomes of informal 
agreements and personal connections, which strengthen the critical voices 
about corruptions.  
 
Consortium partners 
The group of prioritised consortium partners as stakeholders in the 
infrastructural developments were formed just after the city hall realised that 
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the operating costs of the new institutions will be unacceptably high. After 
lengthy and sometimes dangerously complicated negotiations, two important 
partners emerged: the county self-government and the University of Pécs. 
The regional library and knowledge centre was planned to be a joint institution 
maintained by accurately defined financial contributions from the three 
partners, while the Zsolnay cultural quarter provides benefits for the University 
(classrooms, departments). The involved stakeholders had moderate 
influence on the planning process. Generally the project leaders tried to 
integrate a lot of local (mainly cultural) public or semi-public organisations into 
the new institutions, according to cost-saving goals, nevertheless realisation 
of joint strategy-making efforts failed.  
 
Local governments in the region and abroad 
Unfortunately, ECC-related partnerships with neighbouring settlements almost 
failed, mostly because the city hall lost sight of this original goal to cooperate 
with the region. However, at the international level, the city reached relevant 
outcomes. (ECC Pécs 2010 evaluation report, 2011). It was obvious to 
cooperate with German and Turkish partners, as parallel ECC projects took 
place in the Ruhr area and in Istanbul. On the other hand, promising 
opportunities arose related to the creation of the so-called Southern Cultural 
Zone, by the integration of Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian and Romanian cities.  
In addition, to politicians, some local artists and other civil cultural actors had 
the chance to participate in these international partnerships and hopefully 
some of these cooperations will still exist in the future (most likely this would 
be the Zagreb, Novi Sad (the newest twin-city of Pécs), Banja Luka, Tuzla 
and Subotica partnership. The on-going cooperations increasingly focus on 
the acquisition of EU financial resources, while the cultural aspects have been 
marginalised. 
 
Local intellectuals, professionals, artists and generally the civil sector 
During the ECC start-up years the city hall was generally active about 
integrating local intellectuals, professionals and artists. There were different 
bodies (already mentioned above) with independent professionals, however, 
these forums were just for consultative functions, without relevant decision-
making competences. Later most of these bodies were dissolved (interview 
F). This process of continuous marginalisation badly influenced the 
willingness of the local civil sector to participate: loss of confidence became 
typical, the legitimacy of the planning and implementation activities 
decreased, the habitants of Pécs became ambivalent towards the ECC 
(Takáts, 2011). It was clearly controversial that the mayor announced a civil 
tender, but without enough financial resources (Tarrósy, 2011). The local 
intellectuals, artists and professionals became also frustrated and 
disappointed. They gave up the chance for effective participation, and 
“locked” themselves into a character of independent critics (Takáts, 2011). It 
is indisputable that the city hall just imitated the intention to create real 
partnerships. Beside these circumstances the civil sector itself remained 
disorganised despite the common interests and frustrations, failed to 
demonstrate unity or to present alternative methods, structures and strategies 
(Pálné Kovács, 2010). 
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b. Public participation, public accountability, transparency 
 
The continuous arguments and scandals, the acute uncertainties about the 
infrastructural investments, the perpetual personnel changes in the different 
level of the structures, furthermore the critical articles, statements and 
interviews in the local and national media were badly against the civil 
participation (Koltai, 2011). Mobilisation and integration of the local population 
failed, attempts of the city hall were not enough to overcome this challenge.  
 
In some cases the locals were asked about general questions, but not in an 
organised way and just via online sites. In general, there wasn’t any attempt 
for dialogue or real community building. In addition, access to public 
information and data took place in a slow and insufficient way, which 
hampered transperancy of the project (Somlyódy, 2010). Only one example 
about these deficiencies: feasibility studies of the ECC Pécs key 
infrastructural developments were released just after a civil movement called 
Társaság a Közérdekű Adatokért (Society for Data of Public Interest) 
submitted and won a lawsuit against the local government.  
 
Essential good practices also emerged thanks to the ECC project. The most 
important of these results is the broadly recognised importance of the bottom-
up spirit although this civil enthusiasm was damaged a lot during the start-up 
years. Some of the civil attempts which started during the ECC programme 
and are still functioning include: 
 An online and offline consultative forum on several topics [EKF – A fal 
(www.afal.hu)] by relatively broad public participation. 
 City Cooperation (www.varoskoop.pecsicivil.hu/city_cooperation/) for 
the participative planning of sustainable development.   
 
 
5. Being adaptive to changing contexts 
 
During the start-up period and also in the official season year, there was a 
constant pressure to be adaptive because of the hectic organisational and 
financial challenges. Two aspects have to be underlined:  
 Usually, unprepared ad hoc crisis management happened in the name 
of adaptation, and not conscious flexibility. 
 Decision-makers cannot cope with the challenge of multi-level 
governance in a practical sense. Governance principles of the EU were 
rejected both by the central and local government. Nonetheless, the 
relative success of adaptation intentions of the Management Centre is 
clear since this institution is still functioning, responsible for 
development projetcs. 
 
a. Aspects of reflexivity 
 
The central government and the city hall wanted to interfere more into the 
functions of independent management actors. This interventional attitude 
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badly influenced the progress of infrastructural developments as well as the 
cultural programming (interview G). Although the management adapted to the 
EU criteria and expected organisational frameworks, the two main decision-
maker bodies could not harmonise to these mechanisms. 
 
Local stakeholders, actors of the local civil and the business sector were quite 
well-informed about EU mechanism. Although, this knowledge was not 
absolutely comprehensive, it could have been useful for the local government 
by valuable and helpful experiences. To ignore this knowledge was a serious 
mistake. Nonetheless, it is no doubt that the Regional Development Agency 
just as the Management Centre acquired a fairly well-functioning human base 
and operational culture. This organisational learning would be important 
outcomes for the local government as well, although it seems that Regional 
Development Agency will be increasingly controlled by the central 
government. 
 
b. Barriers to adaptability and attempts to overcome these challenges 
 
One of the main barriers to organisational adaptability was the lack of 
comprehensive systematic management structure. The whole preparation 
process was not analysed according to professional management aspects. 
Only mandatory ex ante and ex post feedbacks reacted to the problematic 
circumstances; but without systematic responses the deep evaluation of the 
positive mechanisms and the negative experiences failed (interview F). The 
monitoring reports for the EU mainly summarised the activities of the 
management but without detailed comments. Although, the implementation of 
the infrastructural development later became strictly standardised (albeit 
much of the governmental decrees were adopted too late), however many 
dysfunctional methods remained (interview E). 
 
The financial sustainability of the new institutions has also generated a lot of 
problems, while the management could not influence the strategic 
conceptions of the investments (interview E). The feasibility studies already 
emphasised this, however, the decision-makers mostly neglected the different 
recommendations (feasibility studies of the ECC 2010 Pécs, 2009). The 
exclusion of local civil and business actors also strikes back now: the city hall 
cannot integrate external sources for management of the facilities, so the only 
source of funds is via national contributions, which in turn seriously threatens 
the local ownership. The marketisation of the functional capacities of the new 
infrastructural developments, what is more, the “sale” of the whole ECC 
project failed (Pálné Kovács, 2012). Maybe the city not even had a real 
strategic intention about this challenge. Without external market sources, 
parallel investments and sustainable financial management, the operation of 
these new institutions will be a constant problem.  
 
The management structure had to struggle with professional deficiencies 
because the necessary knowledge was not available generally, rather 
individually, and the continuous personnel changes blocked the evolution of 
intellectual and technical capacities. However, even though the operational 
autonomy of the management was not expanded formally, its independence 
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was strengthened informally and resulted in reduced employee turnover and 
incidents of personal conflicts (interview D). The relationship between the 
local government and the management therefore became consolidated after 
some informal status-compromises (interview D).  
 
In conclusion, we can say that adaptability and reflexivity among the local 
actors (in the case of the local government as well as the local stakeholders 
too) were significantly better than on the central level. The “locals” usually had 
to act without enough information, not to mention the constant financial 
shortages. Their adaptability and reflexivity often served as a correcting option 
to the failures of the central level. 
 
 
6. Realising place-based/territorial specificities 
 
The selection criteria of the international jury just as the EU expected and also 
(or therefore) the conception of the ECC Pécs 2010 placed great emphasis on 
the territorial aspects as well as on the local capacities and capabilities 
(Plagge, 2009). However, this spirit was removed from the agenda after the 
success of the bid (Bakucz, 2008).     
 
a. The tendering process 
 
After announcing the possibility of an ECC season in Hungary, the 
government mobilised its diplomatic lobby capacities (interview C). Thereafter, 
the European Commission authorised the Hungarian government to designate 
a host city, the National Cultural and Heritage Ministry announced a two-stage 
tender. In the first stage, eleven cities submitted their bid, and the seven-
member jury gave green light for seven candidates, including Pécs with clear 
support. In parallel with the elaboration of the detailed ECC bids, complicated 
political lobby activities and rivalries evolved in the background. The prime 
minister was under pressure to announce the official nomination of Budapest, 
as the ECC will be an EU debut for Hungary, so the capital is the only 
potential host city; others would be too risky (interview G). Behind the political 
arena, the quasi centre-periphery debate influenced the intellectuals too. 
Heated polemics emerged on the pro-contra arguments about the nomination 
in several periodicals and forums.   
 
Summarising, we can say that although the conception was indisputably high-
level and coherent, it reinterpreted the role of local cultural capitals, not to 
mention the positive echo of the civil commitment behind the initiative. 
However, political pressure and explicit territorial considerations were also key 
factors related to the success of the ECC bid of Pécs. If the mayor and the 
lobby of Baranya county were weaker among the members of the coalition-
leader party (there were two ministers in the cabinet from Pécs as well as the 
President of the Parliament was a “local” too), in all likelihood Budapest would 
have been the nominated host city (interview A). 
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It was not accident that the Pécs bid emphasised the significance of cultural 
decentralisation and the necessary counter-balance of territorial and 
functional concentration of the country when the governmental reform got 
started with the goal of creation of political regions.    
 
b. The failure of realising place-based/territorial specificities 
 
The ECC bid was explicitly based on the spirit of emerging consciousness of 
the periphery, including the idea to expand cultural cooperation across the 
wider region and beyond the Croatian border as the “gate of the Balkan”. This 
regional vision was supported by the fact that the so-called pole programme 
financed by the Structural Funds also had the aim to develop the regional 
centres to contribute to regional development and inner cohesion. During the 
implementation phase these “locally specific” aspects were not in the focus.  
 
The impacts of excessive territorial concentration 
The faded commitment to the original aim of creating broad cooperations 
destroyed the possibility of regional partnerships and intensive connections in 
the city agglomeration (Pálné Kovács, 2012). The ECC Pécs became a one-
time development without parallel investments in the city or the region (Inkei, 
2012). The regional cultural-touristic capabilities were absolutely ignored, 
which has been a major reason why the business sector investments in the 
city are significantly lower than was expected during the tendering phase 
(Trócsányi, 2008). And as a result, parallel touristic developments, for 
example constructions of new hotels, recreation and entertainment centres, 
sport facilities, as well as investments in the local catering sector usually didn’t 
make it past the planning phase.  
 
Effects on the city’s urban development 
Impacts of the project are observable on the urban territorial structure of Pécs 
(Trócsányi, 2011). Although the original idea was to concentrate the financial 
resources on the rehabilitation of the city centre and frequented areas, the 
fact that local politicians wanted to achieve some spectacular results in their 
individual electoral districts meant that revivial projects of public spaces and 
parks were also implemented far from the centre in a rather uncoordinated 
manner. The revival of peripheral public spaces meant that while the quality of 
life could conceivably be improved in some places, the fragmentation and 
dillusions of the financial sources resulted in much of the developments being 
implemented with a poor quality (Magay, 2010). 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The case of Pécs exemplifies where the dominance of a centralised 
governance context did not allow for the implementation of the original ECC 
governance logic. The other important lesson is that even the regulatory 
framework of Structural Funds does not favour local engagement in such an 
integrated project. We have to draw the conclusion that such a large and 
important project being implemented on such a short time scale does not 
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provide the impetus to change the governance paradigm. In this light we 
argue that territorial governance demands proper national legal and 
institutional frames besides of course the local preconditions; and the 
temporal project management should fit into the general governance 
framework locally as well.  
 
Positive lessons: 
 Bottom-up approach and activity in the planning phase of the project, 
which resulted in a winng bid. 
 Likewise, the involvement of the civic society and creative class in the 
shaping of the vision. 
 The ambition to bridge the cultural programming with the economic and 
urban development. 
 Outsourcing the management of the project together with some 
partnership. 
 
Negative lessons: 
 Strong determination of centralised governance structures and culture. 
 Lack of local competences and resources. 
 The Structural Funds financial scheme hindered the intergrated 
implementation. 
 Lack of trust towards any “independent” actors. 
 Inability to integrate different interest and aspects. 
 Absence of local businesses and other key stakeholders in order to 
create branching development opportunities and investments.  
 Lack of culture and routine of cooperation, communication, evaluation 
 Lack of territorial embeddeddness of city governance. 
 
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the experience: 
 ECC project was a very effective external motivation to initiate a 
bottom-up, complex development programme and to require horizontal 
governance elements. Due this project new initiatives emerged. The 
local intelligence is therefore pushing the local government to open the 
gates during the new planning process for EU cohesion policy. 
 But this alone is not sufficient to change the traditional administrative 
structures and attitudes because it is too short in time and did not take 
into consideration the political, administrative, cultural contexts which 
have much stronger determination for the actors than the new 
challenges.  
 The volume and size of the project on its own caused a shocking effect 
and it became the source of a number of conflicts and contradictory 
consequences. 
 The logic of multi-level governance is crucial and necessary for the 
success of the European cohesion policy but it has many obstacles in 
centralised countries. The asymmetric power picture could be 
counterbalanced by much stronger European role. Without local space 
of movement and responsibility the place-based projects will be just a 
performance of marionette puppets.   
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 New schemes of Structural Funds are welcome since it promotes the 
so called “community led local development” and “integrated territorial 
development”. These new schemes provide more opportunities for 
local implementation and control of place-based projects. 
 The EU requirements should deal with the decision-making and 
institutional model of the development programmes more detailed. It 
would launch special programmes for local governments and other 
local actors to build capacities for preparing such locally integrated 
development programmes.  
 
The efforts of Pécs regarding ECC project management were not bad but the 
external determination strongly limited the local discretion. The city was rather 
the audience than the provider of its “own” cultural events. What is more 
important however is the fact that the new governance challenges have not 
penetrated the local government structure, thereby providing little in the way 
of key lessons that can be learned for moving forward.  As a result, the 
original long-term goals about sustainable economic development have not 
come to fruition and the remnants of the project are large, new, underused 
buildings. 
 
8. Promoters and inhibitors of territorial governance 
 
Promoters of territorial governance 
 The integrating role of the Regional Operative Programme.  
 Learning of special management knowledge about how to deal with 
large scale, complex urban development. 
 Active local civic engagement during the bidding phase. 
 The official website of the project as an informational tool. 
 The need to cope with unexpected crisis situations and the role of the 
general (conceptual) agreement between the town and the central 
government. 
 Organisational learning about cultural and infrastructural project 
implementation. 
 Regionalism and bottom-up spirit as basic conceptual requirements 
about the ECC tenders. 
 
Inhibitors of territorial governance 
 Disintegrated financial mechanisms of cultural and urban 
(infrastructural and economic) development. 
 Central governmental efforts to hamper the local government's 
competencies in relation to the financial and decisional aspects. 
 Domination of the central level and the management of Structural 
Funds. 
 Failure to integrate local actors during the programming and 
implementation stages. 
 Closed networks of the political elite dominated the organisational 
structures, decisions and processes. 
 Difficulty gaining information on public interest. 
ESPON 2013 25 
 The complex structure of multi-level governence as a hampering factor. 
 Often occurring organisational changes and instability in the staff 
structure. 
 Regional cultural-touristic capacities and possibilities for cooperation 
were ignored. 
 Local knowledge sources (recommendations from actors of the local 
business sector, artists, planners and other professionals) during the 
implementation phase were also ignored. 
 
From the perspective of territorial governance, the differnces between the 
normative view of multilevel cooperation (that were effectively positioned in 
order to secure the ECC project funding) and the reality (that ensued during 
project development) show that it is one thing to conceive a notion of 
multilevel governance, but it is nother thing altogether to implement it in 
practice. Conicidentally, this in turn highlights the usefulness of this report; for 
providing examples of good practices as well as potential barriers to the 
development of good multilevel governance.  
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List of interviewees: “All interviewees are listed in a random order to 
guarantee anonymity.” 
Name Function, institutional affiliation Date Place 
Márton Méhes artistic director of ECC Pécs 
2010 (between the 1st of 
January 2007 and 23rd of 
November 2007) 
15th 
November 
2012 
Pécs 
András Bozóki minister of culture (between the 
14th February 2005 and the 8th 
June 2006) 
7th December 
2012 
Budapest 
Márta 
Schneider 
under-secretary of Ministry of 
Culture 
8th November 
2012 
Budapest 
Zoltán Pál member of the artistic board 20th 
November 
2012 
Pécs 
Csaba Ruzsa head of Pécs 2010 
Management Centre (between 
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